Abstract: This position paper argues that at this time of Mexico's ongoing big transformation, legal educators and researchers in Mexico need to pay greater attention to international economic law, and that a renewal and perhaps some re-orientation of the approach to teaching international economic law, could provide significant contributions to and shape and support both the objectives and outcomes of reform in Mexico. International Economic Law courses and research can be made more useful, not only for students themselves, but also for their contribution towards the role that academics, lawyers, and other epistemic communities need to play in the political, economic and social evolution that is accelerating in Mexico.
Introduction
Mexico at this time is experiencing a significant transformation as a result of President Enrique Peña Nieto's new reforms. In this context, President Peña Nieto's first year in office stands out. Since his December 1 st , 2012 inauguration his government has promoted a wave of deep-ranging structural reforms which are updating the country's legislative and institutional frameworks in line with some of the most advanced international best practices.
During its first 13 months in office, the Peña Nieto administration oversaw congressional authorization of a remarkable array of reforms in education, labor, telecommunications, banking, taxation, business competition, electoral rules, government transparency laws, and the energy sector. These achievements rested on the so-called Pacto por México (Pact for Mexico), careful management of powerful interest groups, a packed legislative calendar, and a bit of good fortune.
Together they enabled President Peña Nieto to achieve what his far more popular predecessors failed to accomplish.
With this reform outlook and new regulatory framework, most secondary laws resulting from the constitutional reforms are still under construction, this position paper argues that legal educators and researchers in Mexico need to pay greater attention to international economic law (IEL). One of the challenges for Mexico with this branch of law, is to provide broad scholarship opportunities to universities and education centers to spread the teaching of IEL; not only with law students but also with law teachers and researchers, legal practitioners, policy makers including legislators and bureaucrats, and other stakeholders drawn from business, journalism, consumers, industry associations, civil society, and non-governmental organizations. Structural reforms from President Peña Nieto's administration will affect all of these sectors. Negotiated secretly during the presidential transition and signed publicly the day after Peña Nieto's inauguration, the Pacto bound the signatories to work together to advance ninety five legislative initiatives. These were grouped into five broad categories:
1. Economic growth, employment and competitiveness; 2. Societal rights and liberties;
3. Justice and security;
4. Transparency, accountability and combating corruption;
5. Democratic governance.
Most analysts doubted the Pacto would survive long enough to address Mexico's most pressing policy challenges, and its death was foretold repeatedly during 2013. Its surprising survival and effectiveness reflected the president's need for cooperation with the opposition, and the political logic behind the parallel but autonomous decisions of the PAN and PRD to propose a broad policy accord with the government. The agreement carefully balanced the core policy concerns of the president and the opposition 4 .
Since the Pacto, President Peña Nieto submitted several reform initiatives in education, telecommunications, banking, taxation, business competition, electoral rules, government transparency laws, and the energy sector.
Most important reforms linked with IEL
Despite these major reforms in the political realm with changes in electoral and transparency rules, and the education and labor sectors, we will focus on the economic industry which has a direct relationship with IEL. state ownership of underground resources; the suppression of individuals' rights to oil and gas through concessions; the incorporation of private contracts to explore and extract resources under conditions established by the government, and the possibility that individuals would undertake refining and transportation activities at their own cost, among other concepts.
On the other hand, the energy reform will enable PEMEX to concentrate on the oil industry's substantive activities. The basis of the restructuring is to form a single PEMEX entity by eliminating duplications generated by having four Subsidiaries 7 , strengthen support functions for operations, and increase transparency in all of its activities. PEMEX's subsidiary bodies will be integrated into two divisions: (i) exploration and production, focusing on extraction of oil and gas hydrocarbons from reserves with delivery for end-use processing, and (ii) industrial transformation, aimed at processing oil and gas fuels, oil-bearing products and petrochemicals.
The tax reform will establish a new fiscal regime for PEMEX with conditions similar to other global companies. This will allow it to be more competitive with greater resources for investment. This will promote greater transparency and accountability in the oil sector, through the institutional strengthening of the government and its decentralized agencies: the National Hydrocarbons Commission along with the Energy Regulatory Commission.
Finally, the reform proposes the Mexican state award shared utility contracts to PEMEX and private companies to extract oil and gas. Furthermore, the government will award permits to PEMEX and private businesses for refineries, petrochemicals, transportation and storage of oil, gas and petroleum products 8 .
With these reforms, Mexico's government is quite conscious about the new challenges and opportunities which lay ahead. For example: reforms in Colombia and Brazil give clear indication of what can be achieved by giving the oil and gas sector appropriate rules. Thanks to these reforms, oil production has increased significantly, which contrasts with the fall in Mexico's energy production 9 . In Brazil, 841, 000 barrels per day were produced prior to the 1997 7 1. Exploration and Production 2. Pemex-Refining 3. Pemex subsidiary which processes, transports and commercializes natural gas, liquid hydrocarbons and basic petrochemical products 4. Pemex Petrochemicals. 8 In the case of electricity generation, the state owned company Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), may neither grant licenses, nor production/profit sharing contracts for the transmission and distribution of electrical energy. However, all other activities in the electricity industry are open to contracts with private entities. 9 Energy Data Management, Energy Department, USA, January-April 2013.
reform. Fifteen years later, Brazil has nearly tripled its production up to 2.1 million barrels per day. Similarly energy reform in Colombia has to nearly doubled its original production 10 .
In the case of Mexico, investment obtained following the passage of this reform bill enabled the country to formulate a long-term hydrocarbon model which takes into account the welfare of future generations.
Antitrust sector (Competition and Telecom reforms)
The year 2013 will be remembered as one of the most important years in modern history for The intention to take action against the lack of effective competition and the high levels of market concentration in the telecom sector were evident from the beginning of President Peña
Nieto's administration. The first action taken was the "Telecom Bill of Amendments" which aimed to provide regulators with effective powers to create favorable conditions for competition.
Likewise, contrary to Constitutional technique, it set forth very detailed rules which would normally pertain to secondary laws rather than the Constitution. However, the lack of competition in Mexico is not exclusive to the telecom industry. In fact, it is pervasive throughout nearly every industry in Mexico. Therefore, despite its name, through the Telecom Bill of Amendments the government has dramatically altered competition policy and enforcement rules and laws within all Mexican industries.
The most important changes to the competition regime are those regarding institutional design.
The 2013 . The FCEC will handle matters of general competition policy and FIT will be the exclusive agency for competition in the telecom sectors including radio and TV 13 .
Before the 2013 Amendment, it was the former Federal Law of Economic Competition (FLEC) which granted powers to the FCC; the Mexican Constitution merely mandated the prosecution and punishment of monopolies or monopolistic practices which caused actual harm to consumers. Thus, Congress delegated powers to the FCC. The 2013 Amendment is particularly distinguishable in that the Constitution, not Congress, explicitly grants powers directly to the FCEC and FIT. These powers include the ability to remove barriers to competition and the free market, regulatory access to "essential facilities," and divestiture of assets in necessary proportion to remove anticompetitive effects. One important factor to note is that Article 28 of the Constitution seems to redefine the concept of monopoly and excessive concentration of powers and not simply rely on monopolistic practices.
Another major feature instituted at the constitutional level was the creation of specialized telecom and competition courts which will sit at the Federal District and have jurisdiction for the entire Mexican territory. Presumably it eliminates forum shopping, but could create "judicial capture". Currently, the Federal Judicial Council has re-assigned certain federal administrative courts as specialized tribunals for telecom and competition matters. forcing consumers to pay exaggerated prices. Therefore, the 2013 Amendment sanctions cartel behavior as per se illegal in one of its hypothesis to align it symmetrically with FLEC.
In the Telecom landscape, the primary goals of the bill were to increase competition in the telecommunications industry of Mexico and give regulators the power to break up dominant monopoly-type players in the market 14 .
The bill empowers FIT to break up dominant firms in Telecom industries where those firms control more than 50% of their respective markets. This power applies not only to the telecommunications market, but also the broadcasting industry, which is also dominantly controlled by a few companies such as Televisa and TV Azteca. FIT will also be given the power to grant and revoke broadcast and telecommunications concessions.
The reform bill also addresses the cap on foreign investment. The bill will remove the 49% cap which is currently in place for foreign investors who want to invest in the fixed-line 14 The current status of the Mexican telecommunications industry poses many barriers to investment. A recent report released by the U.S. Trade Representative's Office highlighted many of the challenges that are faced by foreign investors. The part of the report that addressed Mexico mainly expressed concern over the dominant positions that Telcel and Telmex hold in the mobile and fixed phone markets, as both are controlled by the same parent company, América Movil. As of 2012, Telcel had 70% of the market share for mobile subscribers in Mexico, and Telmex held about 80% of the market share for fixed line subscribers in Mexico. According to the report, the Mexican Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFETEL) has attempted numerous times to lower long distance and mobile termination rates, but the existing suppliers of the telecommunications services have used judicial proceedings to stall these actions. The mixture of an inefficient court process as well as weak regulatory oversight by Mexican agencies in turn means that the disputes COFETEL filed involving competition in the market have been lingering for years. In addition to the monopolies currently in place, foreign companies are also deterred from investing in the Mexican telecommunications market because of the current laws in place that create difficulty for foreigners to invest in the industry. One of these laws is the Foreign Investment Law, which limits the foreign ownership of the wired telecom industry to 49%. Foreign investors must also jump through more hoops than domestic companies if they want to invest in the telecommunications industry because Mexican law states that fore ign companies are required to form joint ventures with Mexican partners in order to provide any satellite-based services in Mexico. See ESTEVEZ, 2013. One of the lawsuits involves the fixed-line industry, in which Telmex has 80% control of the market. The Mexican Federal Attorney's Office of Consumer (PROFECO) filed suit in civil court in order to attempt to recover money on behalf of millions of telephone users. This suit is taking advantage of a law that was put into place in 2012, which basically allows for the equivalent of a class-action suit in the United States, the only difference being that the right to the cause of action is given to a government agency rather than a group of citizens. At the core of the suit is the issue that Telmex has been illegally charging a fee to all fixed-line subscribers who opted to keep their names out of a public directory. According to PROFECO, the fees that were being charged to the subscribers were unconstitutional because the Mexican Constitution guarantees the right to privacy, therefore the option to keep your name out of the public directory should be free. The other action involves the wireless service provider, Telcel. PROFECO filed suit against Telcel in February 2013. The Telcel suit was filed on the basis that Telcel has failed to reimburse subscribers for a series of service outages that occurred.
diverse provisions of the Financial Law and issues of the Law of Financial Groups, passed the
Chamber of Deputies the same day. Additionally, on November 26, the Senate Chamber passed the bill without any amendments; therefore, to become enforceable, the modified statutes needed only to be promulgated and published in the Official Federation Gazette.
According to statements made by the executive branch, and legal pronouncements issued by the legislative branch, the Financial Reform is based on the following fundamental grounds:
 The creation of new incentives encouraging banks to provide more loans;
 Contributions toward fair competition with regard to the banking and financial system, so that rates and expenses are reduced;
 The fortification of the financial and banking system so it may experience long-term, continuous growth;
 The establishment of a new chain of command for the development-banking sector which will contribute to the evolution of the financial sector;
 The strengthening of the financial authorities' legal power to impose penalties; For the interest of IEL, the bill may adversely affect foreign companies with Maquiladora 17 interests in Mexico. In addition, the bill substantially increases the scope of items subject to Mexican value-added tax, VAT. Indeed, the bill sets forth several tests which Maquiladora must meet in order to qualify for the income tax benefits available for such type of companies 18 , such as manufacturing, assembly, transformation, repair or refurbishing activities for a foreign-related party, and the product subject to any of these processes must be exported out of Mexico. The materials, components and parts used by the Maquiladora must generally be furnished by a foreign-related party. Any materials which are sourced from domestic vendors should also be exported out of Mexico.
Also, in performing its activities, the Maquiladora may use self-owned machinery and equipment, as well as machinery and equipment owned by the foreign-related party. However, the net value, calculated under Mexican tax rules, of the hardware owned by the foreign-related party has to represent at least 30% of the aggregate net value of all the machinery and equipment used by the Maquiladora. Finally, Maquiladora may not earn revenue from any other activities.
U.S. companies which have Maquiladoras with various types of activities should consider
restructuring their operations in Mexico to segregate export activities from other activities.
Concerning Value-added tax, imports made by Maquiladoras will be subject to a 16%
VAT rate, payable at the point and time of entry. As of 2013, these imports were subject to a 0%
VAT rate.
The bill contemplates more changes regarding income tax, the imposition of strict requirements which severely limits payments to foreign related parties, a tax of 10% on dividends paid by a Mexican company to Mexican residents, individuals and foreign owners among others 19 . 17 The Maquiladora program in Mexico (now known as IMMEX) allowed for materials and components to be temporarily imported into Mexico, duty-free, regardless of their origin. The only stipulation is that the materials had to be exported out within a certain deadline. Once NAFTA was instituted, this practice had to change in order to prevent products made with non-NAFTA materials from being shipped to Mexico for processing and then shipped to the U.S. completely duty-free. NAFTA article 303 stipulates that non-NAFTA materials imported into Mexico for assembly/processing are subject to the same duties as if they were permanently exported to Mexico. When this policy went into effect, the duty fees were as high as 20 to 25%. 18 The three basic income tax benefits available for qualifying Maquiladoras are: (1) permanent establishment protection for its foreign-related parties, (2) simplified transfer pricing compliance and (3) the potential to reduce the effective Mexican income tax rate to approximately 17%. 19 See <http://reformahacendaria.gob.mx/>.
Teaching and Research IEL in Mexico: New Challenges For New Reforms

IEL Course offerings and research in Mexico
Without going into a detailed account of the present state of and the future prospects for law school education in Mexico, it is nevertheless relevant to note the constraints which any improvement efforts of the system must address. The obvious constraints in an unequal country like Mexico are inadequate financial and academic resources which limit opportunities for both teaching and research. The problem affects both public and private institutions with under-funded libraries, limited electronic resources, including basic computers in some cases, and a scarcity of suitable updated study materials and books. In addition, inadequate remuneration fails to attract qualified and committed faculty to teaching careers, leading to low standards 20 . Further, the resources which do exist, tend to be located in elite institutions leading to huge quality differences in Mexican law schools.
There are 31 separate states and one federal district in Mexico known as Mexico City.
Each of them has a variable number of public and private universities offering law degrees and among them Master and PhD degrees 21 . According to the Ministry of Public Education, there are 975 universities in Mexico offering law degrees through 1597 different law programs. Despite that sizeable number, the education, faculty, curricula and research standards, when applicable, are quite dissimilar. The cities which have the greatest concentration of law schools are Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey 22 . In most of them legal education standards are acceptable, and in a few of them outstanding, comparable to any law school in the developed world with high standards. On the other hand, standards in many of the non-elite law colleges spread across Mexico remain low.
In most Mexican universities and their corresponding law programs, IEL is not included as part of the curriculum. In the best-case scenario it is treated as a special module or spread out with other courses such as administrative law, intellectual property or finance law. 20 The National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT), which is the Mexican agency for supporting and stimulating research in Mexico, makes an additional effort to support economically professional research in Mexico through the National System for Research (SNI Of the universities mentioned above, only five communicate and share with each other and with law schools worldwide the challenge of preparing students for the increasingly globalized practice of law. IEL encompasses a wide spectrum of subjects including trade in goods and services, financial law, economic integration, development law, antitrust law, business regulation, and intellectual property among others topics.
In the case of UNAM, the law school program offers IEL courses every semester at the bachelor degree level. It is one of the unique law schools which offers a complete course in All of these Mexican universities have international student exchange programs with universities worldwide. IEL courses in Mexico need to be more present in universities curricula. However, they must not be orientated towards preparing a student for a possible, though extremely unlikely, career at the WTO, or in a Brussels or Washington trade law firm, or UNCTAD. Neither must they be directed only at preparing a student for a career at a Mexican anti-dumping firm or IP firm. Instead, IEL teaching in Mexican universities must be made relevant for many more students who will end up working for Federal, state or municipal governments, become entrepreneurs, join private business or industry as lawyers or managers, enter politics, or work in media. More specifically, IEL teaching and research will also contribute towards trade policymaking in Mexico by involving greater numbers of stakeholders. Thus, implementing IEL teaching in Mexico should consider a broader target audience than simply bachelor students. IEL courses could be specifically designed for existing legal practitioners, policy makers, including legislators and bureaucrats, and other stakeholders drawn from business, journalism, consumers, industry associations, civil society, and non-governmental organizations.
New challenges for IEL teaching and research in Mexico
Finally, as mentioned in the case of India 31 , IEL teaching in Mexico needs to cover the domestic and international issues that IEL raises. Indeed, a focus on domestic issues in the IEL classroom and research agenda will help in better identification of IEL related concerns for Mexico. Rather than treating international treaties as foundational material and then going on to interpret and respond to Mexican problems, the analysis would begin first with a definition of the problem in the light of Mexican reform agendas and then move on to consider how IEL can contribute to the solution.
This section presents very preliminary thoughts on the types of challenges and changes that IEL curricula face in Mexico. These ideas would need to find their concrete shape in specific contexts of curricula design projects in Mexican academic institutions. 31 Ibid.
Conclusion
Mexico needs and has the obligation to teach more IEL in universities at different levels and targeting a broad base of students. Despite the globalization of this economy, north, south and overseas, Mexican academic institutions do not teach and research enough IEL. Only five of the most prestigious universities in Mexico teach some of the principal IEL disciplines, and only UNAM and ITAM have the most important centers for IEL research in Mexico. In particular, ITAM has the Center for International Economic Law with the WTO chair. For the size of its growing economy, Mexico more than ever, needs to teach and research more IEL.
The approval of President Peña Nieto's reforms has been a great success; nevertheless, we come to the complex part creating the secondary laws which will legally frame the reform agenda and its implementation. Mexico has to improve its institutional performance and enhance the administrative capacity of the public sector, at federal state and local levels. At this point, IEL teaching and research has an important role to play. IEL teaching can facilitate a more interactive engagement between the international community and domestic political and economic structures, so that stakeholders can more effectively influence, use and respond to IEL, to achieve broader domestic and international objectives for Mexico.
